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Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
Thomas C. Wingfield*
"It was only one life. What is one life in the affairs of a state?"
- Benito Mussolini,
after running down a child in his automobile
(as reported by Gen. Smedley D. Butler in address, 1931)'
"This Government wants Perdicarisalive or Raisuli dead."
-Theodore Roosevelt, committing the United States
to the protection of Ion Perdicaris, kidnapped by
Sherif Mulai Ahmed ibn-Muhammed er Raisuli,
(in State Department telegram, June 22nd, 1904)2
I.

Introduction

As the two epigraphs above demonstrate, perhaps the best
criterion for discriminating tyrannies from democracies is the
sincere, proven emphasis placed upon the value of a single human
life. The forcible protection of nationals abroad, when undertaken
by a sovereign for non-pretextual reasons, is the clearest expression
of that distinction in state practice. The academic challenge in
evaluating such uses of force is to distinguish such protection from
other legitimate uses of force, and then to distinguish these uses
from other, illegitimate uses of force. Such an examination is
heavily dependent upon the historical context of the threat, and of
the acting state. For, as the Rev. Jesse Jackson has stated, "a text
without a context is a pretext."3

* B.A., Georgia State University; J.D., L.L.M., Georgetown University Law
Center. The author is a former naval officer and is currently Counsel and Principal
National Security Policy Analyst for Aegis Research Corporation.
1. Benito Mussolini, quoted by Gen. Smedley D. Butler, reprinted in THE
POCKET BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 379 (Henry Davidoff ed., 1952).
2. Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in BARBARA TUCHMAN, PRACTICING
HISTORY 115 (1981).
3. Rev. Jesse Jackson, remarks on Nightline (December 15, 1987).
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To properly understand the "text" involved, it is important to
have as clear a definition as possible. Arend and Beck define
"protection of nationals" as "the use of armed force by a state to
remove its nationals from another state where their lives are in
actual or imminent peril." 4 Arend and Beck add four qualifications
to this definition. First, consent obviates the analysis, rendering the
operation something other than coercion or intervention Second,
the threatened nationals need not be within the territory of the
threatening state, merely within its exclusive jurisdiction.6 The
classic example of this would be a rescue from a ship flying the
threatening state's flag.' Third, a Chapter VII authorization would,
like consent of the territorial state, obviate the analysis.8 Assuming
the Security Council is not acting ultra vires, a use of force pursuant
such an authorization is almost by definition lawful.9 Fourth, and
finally, an intervention to protect the citizens of the threatening
state is a humanitarian intervention, not the protection of nationals
4.
ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 94 (1993).

5. See id. Ronzitti further restricts the scope of consent with several criteria:
First of all, consent must come from an authority whose expression of will
is ascribable to the local State ....
Secondly, the expression of will of the
local State must be valid, not vitiated by the so-called 'vices de
volonte.... [T]he consent of the injured State must not only not be given
by error, obtained by fraud, or procured by coercion but must also
comply with the territorial sovereign's internal provisions regarding
competence to be bound.... Thirdly, the action by the intervening State
must be strictly confined to the limits of the consent given by the local
sovereign. The State whose nationals are in mortal danger, even if it is
permitted to enter foreign territory, is not automatically allowed to resort
to force, if it lacks authorization to do so.... Moreover, the action of the
intervening State must not infringe upon the rules by which a State is
duty bound not as regards a particular subject of international law but as
regards the international community as a whole .... [T]he consent of the
State cannot function as an erga omnes defence .... Finally, the consent
must not be contrary to a peremptory rule of international law.
[Footnotes omitted.]
NATALINO RONzITrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY
COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 84-86 (1985). Ronzitti

continues, stating that treaties are a valid vehicle of consent: "Practice shows that,
by virtue of a treaty, a right to intervene in foreign territory for carrying out
activities which would certainly be unlawful without the treaty so providing, is
sometimes given. See id. at 115 (footnote omitted). For an examination of treatybased intervention, see David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say
No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1995).
6. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 94.
7. See id.; see also RONzITTI, supra note 5 at 135-148. Ronzitti also addresses
the use of force against pirates and slavers. See id. at 137-141.
8. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 94.
9. See id.

2000]

FORCIBLE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD

abroad.' ° While the primary discriminator is the nationality of the
victims rescued, the dimensions of the two types of intervention can
vary significantly. The use of force in the protection of nationals
abroad is, at its most pure, a rescue operation, lasting no longer
than the evacuation itself. Humanitarian intervention, on the other
hand, can involve lengthy nation-building or even governmentreplacement in the territorial state." A lengthier, but more precise,
definition would then read: "the use or threat of imminent use of
armed force by a state to safeguard, and usually remove, its
nationals from the territory or exclusive jurisdiction of another
state, without the consent of that state or the authorization of the
United Nations Security Council, where the lives of those nationals
are in actual or imminent peril."
This article will briefly examine the historical foundation for
the forcible protection of nationals abroad, recount a number of
post-Charter uses of force to protect nationals, describe and
evaluate alternate modern theories supporting such actions, and
conclude with a description of the law today.
II.

Historical Development

While an exhaustive historical review of the
of force in the protection of nationals could
volumes, the views of three publicists provide a
subsequent, principally post-Charter analysis.
Vattel wrote what is perhaps the seminal
protection of nationals:

legality of the use
consume several
firm basis for the
paragraph on the

Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its
tranquility, or does it a prejudice in any manner whatsoever,
declares himself its enemy, and exposes himself to be justly
punished for it. Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the
state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of
the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if
possible, oblige him to make full reparation; since otherwise the
citizen would not obtain the great end of the civil association,
which is, safety.

10.
11.

See id.
See id.

12.

MONSIEUR

DE VATrEL,

THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (J. Chitty ed. 1883); see

also Louis B. Sohn, InternationalLaw and Basic Human Rights, in 62 U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977 587-88 (Richard B.

Lillich and John Norton Moore eds. 1980). Professor Sohn traces the use of force
in the protection of nationals abroad back as far as the 11th Century. See id.
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The justification for intervention in such a case is more than
just a right; it becomes a duty of the sovereign. The duty, however,
is tempered by a respect for the sovereignty of other nations:
The prince ... ought not to interfere in the causes of his
subjects in foreign countries, and grant them protection,
excepting in cases where justice is refused, or palpable and
evident injustice done, or rules and forms openly violated, or,
finally, an odious distinction made,
13 to the prejudice of his
subjects, or of foreigners in general.
This duty, and this tension, has been echoed by all subsequent
thoughtful commentators.
Hall, writing at the end of the 19th Century, returned to the
fundamental nature of this duty: "At the root of state life lies the
circumstance that the bond which exists between a state and its
subjects is not severed when the latter issue from the national
territory."' 4 However, Hall adds with British understatement, "the
clashing laws of states of European civilization still place many
persons in situations that are frequently difficult and occasionally
serious."' 5 It is at this point that the sovereign's duty to protect his
subject emerges:
The duty of protection is correlative to the rights of a sovereign
over his subjects; the maintenance of the bond between a state
and its subjects while they are a broad implies that the former
must watch over and protect them with in the due limit of the
rights of other states.... It enables governments to exact
13.

VATTEL,

supra note 12, at 165.

A TREATISE ON THE FOREIGN POWERS AND
JURISDIcrION OF THE BRITISH CROWN 2 (1894). Hall continues, describing the
connection between the sovereign and the subject, and the sovereign's power over
the subject:
The legal relations by which a person is encompassed in his country of
birth and residence cannot be wholly put aside when he goes abroad for a
time; many of the acts which he may do outside his native state have
inevitable consequences within it. He may for many purposes be
temporarily under the control of another sovereign than his own, and he
may be bound to yield to a foreign government a large measure of
obedience; but his own state still possess a right to his allegiance; he is
still an integral member of the national community. A state therefore can
enact laws, enjoining or forbidding acts, and defining legal relations,
which oblige its subjects abroad in common with those within its
dominions. It can declare under what conditions it will regard as valid
acts, done in foreign countries, which profess to have legal effect; it can
visit others with penalties; it can estimate the circumstances and facts as it
chooses.
Id.
15. Id. at3.
14.

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL,
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reparation for oppression they have suffered, or for injuries
done to them otherwise than by process of law; and it gives the
means of guarding them against the effect of unreasonable laws,
laws totally out of harmony with the nature and degree of
civilization by which a foreign power affects to be characterized,
and finally of an administration of laws bad beyond a certain
point. When in these directions a state grossly fails in its duties;
when it is either incapable of ruling, or rules with patent
injustice, the right of protection emerges in the form of
diplomatic remonstrance, and in extreme cases of ulterior
measures. 16
The nature and extent of these "ulterior measures" were principally
a British concern in the 19th Century, but became an American
concern early in the 20th Century, as the United States Navy and
Marine Corps extended America's ability to respond to "laws bad
beyond a certain point."
Borchard, an American writing early in the 20th Century,
addresses with textbook matter-of-factness the use of such force in
the protection of nationals abroad:
The display of force and the threat to use it... have frequently
proved an effective means of obtaining redress .... This display
of force usually takes the form of a national war-ship appearing
before the port of the foreign country alleged to be in default.
The moral influence exerted by the presence of a war vessel is
great, and.., in quarters of the world subject to frequent
domestic disorder has served not only to prevent an abuse of
aliens' rights, particularly of the nationals of the country to
which the vessel belongs.17

Although such displays were frequently
occasionally escalated to actual uses of force:

effective,

they

The army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of
citizens or their property in foreign countries in cases of
emergency where the local government has failed, through
inability or unwillingness, to afford adequate protection to the
persons or property of the foreigners in question." ...

The

occasions on which troops have been landed have varied,
although it has always been under circumstances where the
protective faculties of the local government have been so

16.
17.

Id. at 4.
EDWIN M.
ABROAD 446 (1925).
18. Id. at 448.

BORCHARD,

THE

DIPLOMATIC

PROTECTION

OF

CITIZENS
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weakened that the security of aliens, particularly nationals of
the interfering state, seemed so precarious that some measure of
self-help was deemed necessary.' 9. .. While the landing of troops
in the cases above mentioned has been purely protective, they
have not always been able to avoid belligerent operations to
effect their purpose.2

Vattel, Hall, and Borchard describe a legal regime which
existed from the early 17th Century until the middle of the 20th
Century. It was only with the entry into force of the U.N. Charter
that an entirely new analytical framework was put into place,
ostensibly outlawing the aggressive use of force, but preserving the
Although centuries of state
"inherent" right of self-defense.
practice were not entirely irrelevant, future uses of force to protect
nationals abroad would have to be justified within the new Charter
paradigm.
The first step in understanding this new framework is to review
the significant uses of force in the Charter era (post-1945),
providing the factual background for testing theory and examining
state practice.
III. Uses of Force in the Charter Era
A.

United Kingdom Threatens Intervention in Iran-1946

When rioting broke out in Iran in the summer of 1946, less
than a year after the Charter had entered into force, the British
government was concerned for the safety of British residents
working for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. With the permission
of the Iraqi government, Britain dispatched a contingent of troops

19. Id. at 450. Borchard lists the bases for intervention:
Among the various purposes for which troops and marines have been
(1) for the simple
landed, are the following: [footnote omitted]
protection of American citizens in disturbed localities, the activity of the
troops being in the nature of police duty; [footnote omitted] (2) for the
punishment of natives for the murder or injury of American citizens in
semi-civilized or backward countries; [footnote omitted] (3) for the
suppression of local riots, and the restoration and preservation of order;
[footnote omitted] (4) for the collection of indemnities, either with or
without the delivery of a previous ultimatum; [footnote omitted] (5) for
the seizure of custom-houses, as security for the payment of claims;
[footnote omitted] and for purposes such as the maintenance of a stable
government, the destruction of pirates infesting certain areas, and other
objects.
Id. at 449-50.
20. Id. at 452.
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to Basra, Iraq, near the Iranian border. The U.K. also ordered two
warships to anchor off Basra.2 ' They did this "in order that they
may be at hand for the protection, should the circumstances
demand it, of Indian, British and Arab lives, and in order to
safeguard Indian and British interests in South Persia, troops are
being sent from India to Basra. ' ' 22 The rioting subsided, and no
entry was necessary. The Iranian government still protested the
threat of force as a violation of the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
and an infringement of Iranian sovereignty.23 Britain responded
that it would have intervened in case of a "grave emergency,"24 that
is, if the Iranian government had been unable or unwilling to
protect the lives of British residents.
B. Second Threat of Intervention in Iran by U.K. -1951
The Iranian government precipitated another crisis when it
nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. The British
government once again feared that the heightened tensions
between the two countries might put British residents in Iran at
risk. Accordingly, the U.K. dispatched several warships to Iraqi
waters, and deployed a number of combat aircraft to British bases
within Iraq.2 British policy statements on the move were unusually
clear and to the point. Foreign Secretary Morrison stated that
Britain had "every right and indeed the duty to protect British
lives."26 He went on to elaborate before the House of Commons:
As I have repeatedly informed the House, His Majesty's
government are not prepared to stand idly by if the lives of
British nationals are in jeopardy. It is the responsibility of the
Persian government to see to it that law and order are
maintained and that all within the frontiers of Persia are
protected from violence. If, however, that responsibility were
not met it would equally be the right and duty of His Majesty's
government to extend protection to its own nationals 27

21.

See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 95.
RONZITrl, supra note 5, at 26 (citing 6 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY
ARCHIVES 8084 (1946-1948)).
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 26-27 (citing ParliamentaryDebates (Hanson), 5th series, vol. 488,
House of Commons Official Reports (May 29, 1951)).
27. RONzrrrl, supra note 5, at 27 (citing ParliamentaryDebates (Hanson), 5th
series, vol. 489, House of Commons Official Reports (June 26, 1951)).
22.
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Iran, on the other hand, saw the positioning of air and naval forces
just outside its own borders as a threat of force unwarranted by the
situation. Iran stated that the U.K. had no right to "intimidate"
Iran,' and that Iran was "completely the master of the situation."29
Iran took this policy position one step further, and declared before
a meeting of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly that even if British nationals had been mistreated, any
action to intervene and protect them could not be justified as a
lawful exercise of self-defense.3 °
C. The Cairo Riots-1952
A more subtle response more a more serious threat occurred in
January, 1952, when large-scale rioting broke out in Cairo. This
time, British property was damaged and British lives were lost.3 ' In
response, the U.K. developed a contingency plan to use its troops in
the Suez Canal zone to move in to Cairo and Alexandria to protect
The British government
endangered British residents.32
communicated its willingness to take action in a diplomatic note on
January 27th, stating that it held the government of Egypt fully
responsible for all damage to British property and any threat to the
safety of British residents in Egypt.33 Further, the note warned, the
U.K. reserved the right to take whatever action was required to
safeguard the lives and property of its nationals.' The note had the
desired effect, and the previously quiescent Egyptian army moved
in to put down the rioters.35 Then-Foreign Secretary Eden
explained, "the belief that we had the forces and the conviction that
we were prepared to use them were powerful arguments in
prodding the Egyptian army to quell the riots."36
D. Anglo-French Intervention in Egypt in 1956 (the Suez Crisis)
Fearing that their nationals were threatened by IsraeliEgyptian war of in October, 1956, Britain and France made a series
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 27-28.
32. RONzITrI, supra note 5, at 28. The troops Were present in the Canal Zone
pursuant to a treaty with the government of Egypt, signed on August 26, 1936. See
id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
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of diplomatic entreaties for the belligerents to cease hostilities.
When this course failed, the British and the French bombed
Egyptian airstrips near the Suez Canal and, four days later, inserted
a contingent of troops to occupy key points along the canal.37 While
France emphasized other rationales, Britain relied heavily on its
right to protect their own citizens abroad.38
The British
Representative to the UN, speaking before the Security Council,
said:
In Egypt there are many thousands of British and French
nationals. The chain of events which began with the Israel [sic]
moves into Egypt has developed into hostilities and hostilities
have created a disturbed situation. In those circumstances,
British and French lives must be safeguarded.
I again
emphasize... that we should certainly not want to keep any
forces in the area for one moment longer than is necessary to
protect out nationals.39
Then-Prime Minister Eden stated before the House of Commons
that "there is nothing.., in the Charter which abrogates the right
of a Government to take such steps as are essential to protect the
lives of their citizens."'
He went on to explain that, when the
Security Council was paralyzed by a veto (as it was in this case),
that states had the right to intervene 'in an emergency," to protect
the lives of nationals abroad.4' He added that this right was based
on the inherent Article 51 right to self-defense, 2 and that this right
could be exercised anticipatorily -that is, the injured state need not
first receive the equivalent of an armed attack against its citizens
before moving preemptively against the threat.43
Foreign Secretary Lloyd outlined three criteria for the lawful
exercise of the right of protection of nationals abroad within the
larger right of self-defense: first, that the nationals of the
intervening state be under "an imminent threat of injury;" second,
that there is a "failure or inability" by the local sovereign to protect
foreign citizens; and third, that the action of the intervening state be

37. See RoNzIrI, supra note 5, at 28.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id. Foreign Secretary Lloyd echoed this comment before the House of
Commons, and added that the Security was, in any case, incapable of taking swift
and decisive action. See id.
42. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 29.
43. Id.
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"strictly confined to the object of protecting the nationals against
injury."'
Finally, the Lord Chancellor, before the House of Lords, stated
that "self-defence undoubtedly includes a situation in which the
it is necessary
lives of a State's nationals abroad are threatened and
45
protection.,
their
for
territory
that
on
to intervene
In addition to this rationale, the British and the French also
pursued the military operation to maintain international freedom of
navigation through the canal, and to stop hostilities between Egypt
and Israel.46 The problem of overlapping justifications will reappear
frequently in state practice.
E.

The Belgian Intervention in the Congo-1960

Immediately upon declaring its independence from Belgium in
July, 1960, the Congo's army mutinied and touched off a week of
rioting, looting, and atrocities against foreign nationals.47 As the
Congolese government was completely unable to maintain order,
Belgium ordered a contingent of paratroopers already in the Congo
to protect Belgian and other threatened foreign nationals. ' Before
the Security Council, the Belgian Ambassador to the United
Nations stated that his government had "decided to intervene with
the sole purpose of ensuring the safety of European and other
members of the population and of protecting human lives in
general., 49 This rationale mixes pure self-defense (protecting a
state's own nationals), collective self-defense (protecting other
foreign nationals within another state), and humanitarian
intervention (protecting the citizens of the threatened state).
In Security Council debate, France argued that the Belgian
troops' "mission of protecting lives and property is the direct result
of the failure of the Congolese authorities and is in accord with a
recognized principle of international law, namely, intervention on
humanitarian grounds."5 Argentina based its support of the
Belgian intervention not on the legality of self-defense, but on the
moral imperative of the situation:
44. Id. (citing ParliamentaryDebates (Hanson), 5th series, vol. 199, House of
Lords Official Report (October 31, 1956)).
45. Id. at 29 (citing Parliamentary Debates (Hanson), 5th series, vol. 199,
House of Lords Official Report (Nov. 1, 1956)).
46. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 96.

47. See

RoNzrrrI,

supra note 5, at 30.

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 31 (citing U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg. para. 130 (1960)).
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Now, we are convinced that the protection of the life and
honour of individuals is a sacred duty to which all other

considerations must yield.

We cannot reproach the Belgian

government for having assumed this duty when Belgian
nationals were in danger. Any other State would have done the
same thing."

The United States was more guarded in its statements, and
urged that Belgium should withdraw once the United Nations had
provided military forces to stabilize the situation. In an interesting
gloss on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, Belgium
actually adopted the U.S. position in a statement that is a model of
concise legal advocacy: Belgium would withdraw "its intervening
troops as soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations
ensures the maintenance of order and the safety of persons." 2
F.

United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic--1965

In April, 1965, the Constitutional Party forced the resignation
of Dominican President Reid Cabral 3
Cabral's National
51.

Id. at 32 (citing U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg. para. 118 (1960)).

52. RONZITrl, supra note 5, at 31 (citing U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg. para. 142
(1960)). Two other instances in Africa, both in 1964, do not meet the criteria of
protection of nationals abroad in that they were undertaken with the approval of
the local sovereign. This, of course, renders the action a cooperative one between
nations, and not an intervention with adversary sovereigns.
The first was the evacuation of British citizens in Zanzibar, following a coup
d'etat against the sultan. The new government quietly invited the British, who had
dispatched a warship to the area, to evacuate its own citizens. See id. at 32.
The second incident was a joint U.S. - Belgian operation, again in the Congo,
to rescue foreign nationals from rebels. See AREND & BECK supra note 4, at 97.
According to Professor Lillich, diplomacy and alternative measures had gotten
nowhere: "[T]he United Nations got bogged down in debate upon it. They finally
decided to let the Organization of African Unity attempt to do something: they
tried and they were very, very unsuccessful." Richard B. Lillich, ForcibleSelf-Help
Under InternationalLaw, in 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

REVIEW 1947-1977, supra note 12, at 597 [hereinafter Forcible Self-Help]. The
subsequent intervention was highly successful, and conducted with the permission
of the Congo's government. However, this situation highlights the tenuous nature
of such permission: Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko consented to the
operation, but after it had been set in motion, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba
overruled him. The practical effect of the post hoc withdrawal of permission was
negligible, but it does serve to emphasize the role of timing in such operations. See
Michael Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad, 5 INT'L REL 7
(1977). Professor Sohn noted that, while the scope of the mission was strictly
limited to rescue of the hostages, a certain amount of force was required to effect
their release: "In the process of rescuing them, the army of rebellion was more or
less destroyed, but that was purely incidental." Sohn, supra note 12, at 597.
53. See RONzITri, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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Reconstruction Government immediately organized to regain
control of the country. 4 By the end of the month, the situation was
sufficiently out of hand that the United States felt compelled to
land 400 Marines to evacuate American citizens and other foreign
nationals from the country.5 According to U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Adlai Stevenson,
In the absence of any governmental authority, Dominican law
enforcement and military officials informed our Embassy that
the situation was completely out of control, that the police and
the Government could no longer give any guarantee concerning
the safety of Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that
only an immediate landing of United States forces could
safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and
thousands of citizens of some thirty other countries."
This introduces a hybrid form of invitation-less than the pure
consent rendered by an invitation from the de jure sovereign, but
more than a simple, unilateral decision to intervene based on an
external analysis of the situation. The warnings and requests of
mid-to-high level officials of the defeated but arguably still lawful
government fall squarely within this gray area. While this type of
request does not forestall a legal analysis of the grounds for
intervening (as would an invitation from the sovereign), it does add
weight to the factual arguments establishing the state of chaos in a
country, and therefore helps weed out instances of purely
pretextual intervention.
However valid the basis for forcible protection of nationals
may have been at the outset, U.S. involvement quickly escalated
and policy diversified. The number of troops increased, their stay
in-country was extended, and subsequent government statements
announced that the United States was acting to prevent the
establishment of a second communist government in the Western
Hemisphere. 7 To no one's surprise, Britain supported the initial
deployment, France was ambivalent, and Cuba was opposed. 8

54. See id. at 33.
55. See id. Ronzitti states that "the island was, to all effects, in the throes of
anarchy." Id.
56. AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 97-98 (citing U.N. SCOR, 1196 mtg. para.
14 (1965)).
57. See RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 33.
58. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 98.
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G. The Mayaguez Incident-1975
On May 12th, 1975, Cambodia seized an American merchant
ship, 9 claiming the Mayaguez was in its territorial waters, and on a
spy mission. 6° The United States insisted that the ship had been in
international waters at the time of its seizure, and that it had not
been on a spy mission.61 On May 13th, the U.S. demanded she be
released within 24 hours. Cambodia did not comply, so the United
States launched an airstrike against the facility at which it was being
held.62 The Cambodians still did not comply, so on May 14th, the
U.S. mounted a heliborne Marine infantry assault against the
ship. 63 This action did achieve the desired result, and the ship and
crew were freed. 64
Between the airstrike on the 13th and the assault on the 14th,
the U.S. requested the assistance of the Secretary General of the
United Nations in securing the release of the ship. 5 In the request,
the U.S. reserved the right to take "such measures as may be
necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and property,
including appropriate measures of self-defense under Article 51 of
the UN Charter."'
Cambodia condemned the assault, claiming it was "a brutal act
of aggression., 67 Cambodia also stated that the attack was not
militarily necessary, in that it had already begun preparations to
release the ship. 8 China sided with Cambodia, labeling the assault
an "act of piracy."6 9 Algeria and Thailand also condemned the
attack, the latter because its bases had been used as a staging area
for the assault team.70
H. The Evacuation of U.S. Citizens from Lebanon-1976
When the long-running civil war in Lebanon reached a
threshold threatening the lives of the few Americans remaining in
the country, the Unites States evacuated a small group to a warship
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 35.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 35-36.
See id.
See RONZIMI, supra note 5, at 36.
See id.
Id.
AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 98.
See RONziTrI, supra note 5, at 36.
AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 98 (citing N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1975).
See RONziTT, supra note 5, at 36.
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on June 28, 1976, and again on July 27th.7' Interestingly, the U.S.
consulted no domestic authority before the first evacuation, but
pursued a different course before the second. Instead of requesting
the approval of the de jure Lebanese government, whose influence
over events asymptotically approached irrelevance, the U.S.
coordinated with those actually in control of the territory-the
While this
PLO and several other Palestinian groups.72
coordination, like that with the Dominican quasi-authorities eleven
years earlier, had little influence on the academic legality of the
operation, it did provide an improved chance of conducting the
operation with as few casualties as possible. In this case, no U.S.
servicemen or Lebanese civilians were killed.73
I.

The Israeli Raid on Entebbe-1976

On June 27, 1976, a French airliner enroute from Tel Aviv to
Paris was highjacked by four Palestinian terrorists.7" After a brief
stop in Libya, the aircraft flew to Uganda, where it was joined by
six additional terrorists.75 The terrorists freed all of the non-Israeli
passengers, and specifically threatened the lives of those who
remained.76 The government of Uganda was at best uncooperative
in attempts to negotiate a settlement, and appeared to be providing
support to the terrorists.77
The evening of July 3rd, Israeli commandos stormed the main
terminal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda.7 ' Killed were all of the
terrorists who were holding 96 Israelis hostage, along with several
hostages who stood up in the middle of the melee, a number of
Ugandan soldiers, and one Israeli commando.79 To prevent pursuit,
the Israelis also destroyed the operational Ugandan fighters
(approximately 10) on the tarmac.'
The unique aspect of this raid was that the nationals in
question were taken to the foreign country against their will.81 This
suggests that the foreign nationals concerned were less responsible

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 98-99.

id at 99.
RONZITrl, supra note 5, at 37.
id.
id.
id.
id.
AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 99.
id.
id.
id.
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for weighing the risks involved in travelling to and living in the
dangerous country in question. It is also more difficult for the
intervening state to fashion a pretext in the rush of a terrorist event
than over the course of a long-deteriorating civil situation. Finally,
the actions required to rescue people in a confined hostage setting
are necessarily less intrusive than to secure an area with a foreign
capital against riots.
These three reasons appear to make
intervention in the case of a terrorist event less problematic than
even traditional protection of nationals abroad.
Israel made a forceful case for its rescue mission at a meeting
of the Security Council on July 9. It claimed that it had the right
"to take military action to protect its nationals in mortal danger."82
This right, Israel claimed, was based on the inherent right of selfdefense, "enshrined in international law and the Charter of the
United Nations," and supported by state practice.83 Israel stated
that this exercise of self-defense met the standard of the Caroline
case: "Necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation. " 84 Finally, Israel
explained that the use of force was not directed at Uganda per se,
and employed only as much force as was necessary to secure and
extract its nationals. 8
The United States was the only country to make a clear
statement supporting the legality of the Israeli raid. At the same
Security Council meeting, the U.S. first stated that the intervention86
was "a temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda."
While this sort of breach is normally considered a violation of the
UN Charter, this case, the U.S. argued, fit within an exception.
"There is a well-established right," said the U.S., "to use limited
force for the protection of one's own nationals from an imminent
threat of injury or death in a situation where the State in whose
territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect
them.""' The U.S. stated that this right flows from the inherent
right of self-defense and allows "necessary and appropriate" force

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Rights,

RONZITrI, supra note 5, at 37.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Richard B. Lillich, Introduction to Volume II: The Use of Force, Human
and General InternationalLegal Issues, in 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, supra note 9, at IX, XI (quoting 31 U.N.

SCOR 1941st mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976)) [hereinafter Introduction].
87. Id.
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to protect a nation's own citizens.8 By these criteria, the U.S.
concluded, the raid on Entebbe was a lawful use of force under
international law. The U.S. found the force used to be proportional
to the limited goal of freeing the passengers, and the use of force
had ended once this goal had been achieved.89
France also supported the Israeli intervention, in a manner of
speaking. While stating that "at first sight.., the surprise attack by
an armed force on a foreign airport for the purpose of achieving by
violence an objective" appeared to violate international law, the
Israeli action had not been designed to infringe the territorial
integrity or political independence of Uganda, but merely to save
lives.' The French brought up an additional legal point, that the
UN General Assembly's Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression listed acts which were only prima facie evidence of acts
of aggression, and that it was up to the Security Council to
determine if, "in the light of other relevant circumstances,"
aggression had actually been committed.9'
J.

The French Threat to Intervene in the Western Sahara-1978

On October 25, 1978, two French technicians were captured in
Mauritania by Polisario guerillas.'
Two days later, the French
Defense Minister refused to rule out a military raid to free them.93
A French parachute corps was moved to Senegal, and French
aircraft participated in airstrikes on Polisario military formation on
December 12, 13, and 18.' On December 23, the two technicians
were turned over to the UN Secretary General in Algeria.95
Although the force was not applied in the form of a rescue mission,
its indirect application had the desired result.
K. The Egyptian Raid on Larnaca-1978
The first non-Western use of force to protect nationals abroad
was, at best, a learning experience for all involved. Egypt sent a
plane filled with commandos to Larnaca, Cyprus, on February 19,

88. Id.
89. See id.
90. RONzITri, supra note 5, at 38 (citing U.N. Doc. S/PV 1443, at 28-30, 31
(1976)).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See RONzITrI, supra note 5, at 40.
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1978 to free Egyptian and other hostages taken the day before.96
Although the Egyptians received permission to land, they did not
receive permission to storm the aircraft.97 The Cypriot authorities
were successfully concluding negotiations with the terrorists, and
the passengers had begun to leave the aircraft, when the Egyptians
decided to attack.98 The Cypriot military opened fire on the
Egyptians, arrested the terrorists, and helped the hostages to
safety. 99
The Egyptians defended their actions less as the protection of
nationals abroad (although several of the hostages were Egyptian,
and an Egyptian had been killed by the terrorists in the initial
seizure of the hostages), and more as an amorphous commitment
"to fight terrorism and to bring all those who use such methods to
justice.""l °
L.

The U.S. Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran-1980

On the evenings of the 24th and 25th of April 1980, the United
States launched a commando raid into Iran to rescue 50 hostages
who had been held since November 4th of the previous year.' The
raid ultimately failed due to weather, equipment malfunction, and
bad luck.
Although the hostage incident preoccupied the United States
from late 1979 to early 1981, and was responsible for an enormous
amount of diplomatic maneuvering, the specific question of using
force in the protection of nationals abroad was fairly
straightforward. The ICJ decision in the hostages case, rendered on
May 24th, characterized the actions of the "students" holding the
hostages as fairly educible to the Iranian government: "[T]he
approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other
organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them,
translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of
the hostages into acts of that State."'w This retrospective linking of
the "students"' actions to the Iranian State permitted action against
that state as though it had perpetrated those actions in the first
place.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id. at 41.
See id.
See id.
See id.

RONzITrI, supra note 5, at 41. (citing Le Monde (1978)).
101. See id. at 43.
102. Id. at 4 (citing United States Diplomaticand Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, at 35).
100.
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President Carter stated:
I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard
American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to
reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among
many nations as the crisis continued....

The mission ... was a

humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was
not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken
with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. 0 3
In his report to Congress, he declared: "In carrying out this
operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to
protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory
in which they are located is unwilling or unable to protect them."'o"
While usual countries supported or condemned the raid in
political terms, the Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, echoing
Reisman, provided an illuminating legal comment:
There was.., on the part of Iran alone an extremely serious
infringement of the rules of international law. The State which
falls a victim to such an infringement has the power, under
international law, to resort to self-help. Even the United
Nations Charter recognizes this right as inherent, the exercise of
which is subordinate to the powers and duties conferred on the
Security Council, for restoring the rule of law. But the Charter
also recognizes the right of each permanent member of the
Security Council to veto. Each permanent member must be
aware of the responsibility it takes upon itself when vetoing a

103. Id. (citing Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, No. 2039 (1980)). This
Presidential Statement places an unusual emphasis on feelings. The author was
present at a White House conversation, when a participant in the rescue mission
was asked if he would have killed the Iranian "student" guarding the three
Americans he had been assigned to recover.
"Let's just say," replied the
commando, "that meeting me would have been a significant emotional event in his
life." Notes of Conversation at the White House (April 14, 1995) (on file with the
author).
104. Id. at 45. Ronzitti provides an excellent explanation:
[Under Reisman's theory,] [t]he Charter does not abrogate a State's right
to resort to self-help, including the use of armed force, which belongs to it
under customary international law. The Charter simply suspends the
right to resort to self help, since it entrusts the Security Council with the
task of safeguarding the rights of member States. Whenever this
mechanism does not function, for example when the action of the
Security Council is paralysed by veto, the States are free to resort to selfhelp, under the terms permitted by customary international law.
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resolution of the Security Council, by pointing the way to selfhelp.0 5
M.

U.S. Intervention in Grenada-1983

On October 25th, 1983, the U.S. launched Operation Urgent
Fury, a large amphibious and air assault on the island nation of

Grenada. '06 This was in response to an increasingly anarchic
situation, precipitated earlier in the month by a coup d'etat against
the island's Marxist Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, by hard-line
members of his own government. On October 19th, Bishop and
scores of others were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to regain
control of the island's government.'O' Later that same day, General
Hudson Austin, head of the new "Revolutionary Military Council,"
curfew. '0 8
24-hour, shoot-on-sight
a four-day,
announced
Concerned for the safety of American tourists and medical students
on the island, and alarmed by the presence of a large number of
armed, Cuban paramilitary construction workers on the island
(completing work on an airstrip large enough to support heavy
military aircraft), the United States took action.' 9
Although the Grenadian operation appeared to have the
classic factual predicate for a traditional forcible protection of
nationals scenario, it was not for two specific reasons. First, the
operation was conducted at the request of the Governor-General of
Grenada, whose constitutional authority, particularly in the absence
of any other de jure government, was unsurpassed by any other
Second, the operation was a textbook
claimant to power."'
example of collective self-defense, in that the United States'
105.

RoNziTrI, supra note 5, at 46.

106. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 101; see generally John Norton
Moore, Grenada and the InternationalDouble Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145
(1984); Ronald M. Riggs, The Grenada Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
107. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 101.

108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Moore, supra note 106, at 148, 159-61. Moore explains:
Constitutional niceties of internal authority are difficult to construct
when the only general Constitution of a nation has been previously
suspended in express violation of its provisions and a subsequent
attempted coup has announced the dissolution of the Government that
suspended the Constitution but was unable to consolidate effective
power. It does seem clear in this setting, however, that the authority of
the Governor-General to represent Grenada was stronger than that of
anyone else.
Id. at 159.
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assistance was forcefully and urgently requested by the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.11' Despite the fact that
there appear to be three independently sufficient legal justifications
for the U.S./OECS intervention, 79 governments expressed some
level of disapproval of the operation, and on November 2nd, the
United Nations General Assembly voted 108 to 9 to condemn the
intervention as a "violation of international law."' 1 2 This was
somewhat offset by the overwhelming support for the operation
shown by the people of Grenada."'
N. The U.S. Intervention in Panama-1989
Six years later, another small nation in the Western
Hemisphere had had its democratic election invalidated by a
military strongman, and the latent threat to local citizens and
foreign nationals gradually escalated to unacceptable levels. As
Arend and Beck describe:
On December 20, 1989, the United States launched an invasion
of Panama., code-named Operation 'Just Cause.' In a special
press briefing given that day, Secretary of State James Baker
emphasized that the 'leading objective' of the US military action
had been 'to protect American lives.' [Footnote omitted.]
Earlier on D-Day, President Bush had tersely explained the
rationale for his decision to use force: 'Last Friday, [General
Manuel] Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a
state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the
lives of Americans in Panama.' On Saturday, 'forces under his
command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman,
wounded another, arrested and brutally beat a third American
serviceman and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening

111. See id. at 147-48.
112. AREND & BECK, supranote 4, at 101. President Reagan reported that- the
condemnatory General Assembly vote had not "upset my breakfast at all." Id.
113. See Moore, supra note 106, at 151-53. Moore quotes the results of a CBS
News poll, conducted on November 6th: 62% felt the Americans had come "to
save the lives of Americans living here," 65% said they believed the airport under
construction was being built for Cuban and Soviet military purposes, 76% stated
they believed Cuba wanted to take control of the Grenadian government, 81%
said the American troops were "courteous and considerate," 85% stated they felt
they or their family were in danger while General Austin was in power, 85% said
they felt the American purpose in invading was to "free the people of Grenada
from the Cubans," and 91% were "glad the Americans came to Grenada." Id. at
152.
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her with sexual abuse. That' said the president, 'was enough.'
[Footnote omitted.] It was time to act.ee

Two factors make the analysis of the intervention more
difficult. First is the sheer scale of the operation: ten thousand
American troops eventually seized control of the entire country,
removed the de facto head of state to face drug trafficking charges
in the U.S., and reinstalled the de jure, democratically-elected
government."5 Second, President Bush cited four overlapping
justifications for the intervention: "to safeguard the lives of
Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug
trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal
Treaty."11 6 Of these, claimed Secretary of State Baker, the
protection of American lives was "the leading one."'" 7
Reaction to the invasion was generally negative-mildly so in
Europe, and stridently so in Latin America.' 8 The communist
world was also condemnatory, with the Soviet Union calling the
operation "a violation of the United Nations Charter and of the
universally accepted norms of behavior between sovereign
states."" 9 China simply labeled it "a violation of internal law."' 2
The United States, Britain, and France vetoed a Security Council
resolution condemning the invasion. 2 '
114. AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 93. Professor Lillich recommends the
following additional sources on the invasion of Panama:
Compare Abraham Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in
Panama, 29 COLUMB. J. TRANS. L. 281 (1991) with Louis Henkin, The
Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29
COLUMB. J. TRANS. L. 293 (1991); see also Anthony D'Amato, The
Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 516 (1990); Tom Farer, Panama:Beyond the CharterParadigm,84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 503 (1990); Ved Nanda, The Validity of the United States
Intervention in Panama Under InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494
(1990); John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of
Panama, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 276 (1990); James P. Terry, The Panama
Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, 43 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE R. 110
(1990); Panel, The Panama Revolution, 84 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROCS.
182 (1990); Recent Developments, International Intervention- The
United States Invasion of Panama, 13 HARV. INT'L L. J. 633 (1990).
Richard B. Lillich, ForcibleProtection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian
"Incident" of 1990, in 35 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
205, 206 (1993) [hereinafter Liberia].
115. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 102.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id. (citing N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989).
120. AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 102 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989).
121. See id.
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The U.S. Intervention in Liberia-1990

On August 5th, 1990, the United States landed 255 Marines in
the Liberian capital of Monrovia to evacuate U.S. and any other
nationals desiring to leave the country. 2 2 This was in immediate
response to an announcement the day before by rebel leader Prince
Johnson, who called for the arrest of all foreign nationals in the
capital. 23 Johnson apparently wished to attract international
attention to his rebel faction, and provoke an international
response to the seven month-old rebellion.12 1 In this, he was
successful.
Without seeking or receiving permission from embattled
President Samuel K. Doe or either of the rival rebel faction leaders,
the Marines evacuated approximately one thousand foreign
nationals from Monrovia over a two-week period.
On August
24th, a West African peacekeeping force arrived in Monrovia to
enforce a cease-fire.2 6
Professor Lillich drew this conclusion from the international
community's reaction to the evacuation:
[T]he renewed assertion by the United States of the right of
forcible protection of its nationals during the Liberian disorder,
the fact that hundreds of other foreign nationals from dozens of
States were evacuated with what must have been the
enthusiastic (if not explicit) approval of their governments, and
the near-complete absence of legal or other criticism of the
rescue operation all combine to indicate that the international
community, now more than ever in the post-Cold War period, is
prepared to accept, endorse or, at the very least, tolerate the
forcible protection of nationals abroad in appropriate cases.127
VI. Theoretical Bases for Action
The two major theories addressing the legality of the use of
force in the protection of nationals abroad are the "restrictionist"
theory, which views any such use of force as unlawful, and the
"counter-restrictionist theory," which, as its name implies, holds the
122.
123.
124.

See id.
See id.
See id.
125. See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 102. Included in the evacuated were
French, Canadian, Italian, Lebanese, and even Iraqi citizens. See id.
126. See id. at 102-103. For a more in-depth treatment of the incident, see
Lillich, Liberia, supra note 114, at 205.
127. Lillich, Liberia,supra note 114, at 222-23.
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opposite view. Within the counter-restrictionist theory, there are
several intermingled sub-theories supporting the general premise of
allowing intervention.
A.

The Restrictionist Theory

This theory, which states that there is no lawful basis for the
forcible protection of nationals abroad, rests on three assumptions.
First, it assumes that the sole principal goal of the United Nations is
the maintenance of international peace and security. 128 Second, it
holds that the UN has a monopoly on the lawful use of force, with
the narrow exception for self-defense in the case of armed attack on
the territory of a state. 129 Third, it maintains that any if states were
permitted to use force to protect their nationals abroad, or for any
other reason beyond clear individual or collective self-defense, they
would broaden this narrow mandate, using it as a pretext for any
desired policy ends.1"
Restrictionists concede that, under the pre-Charter legal
regime, states did have the right to use force unilaterally in the
protection of their nationals. However, the say, this right was often
abused, placing weak states at the mercy of stronger ones wishing to
advance national policy through violence. To end this practice,
they conclude, the framers of the UN Charter specifically outlawed
the unilateral use of force, except for the most obvious cases of
national self-defense against armed attack, and then only to the
extent that the Security Council had not yet acted. According to
Ian Brownlie, "[t]he whole object of the Charter was to render
unilateral use of131force, even in self-defense, subject to United
Nations control.'
Arend and Beck concisely summarize the textual basis for the
restrictionist argument:
For their rendition of the jus ad bellum, the restrictionists draw

heavily upon Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. In their
view, the language of Article 2(4) clearly indicates a general
prohibition on the use of force by states. [footnote omitted] No
state is permitted to threaten or use force 'against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'
128.
22.
129.
130.
131.

See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 105; see also Riggs, supra note 106, at
See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 105.
See id.
Id. at 106.
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Article 51, which provides for 'individual and collective selfdefense,' constitutes merely a narrow exception to the general
prohibition of 2(4). [footnote omitted] States may defend
themselves, restrictionists argue, but only after an actual 'armed
attack' upon state territory' has occurred. [footnote omitted]
Typical of the restrictionist view is that described by Waldcock,
himself a counter-restrictionist: '2(4) prohibits entirely any
threat of use of armed force between independent States except
in individual or collective self defense under Article 51 or in
execution of collective measures under the Charter for
maintaining or restoring peace.' [footnote omitted] The UN
Charter's prohibition, the French restrictionist Viraly suggests,
has the broadest range it is possible to imagine.' [Footnote
omitted.]132

The restrictionist theory, in its purest form, allows no use of
force against any terrorist or other groups who are using force
below the level of an invasion by armored column, crossing an
international border.
B.

The Counter-RestrictionistTheory

The counter-restrictionist theory is actually a constellation of
four overlapping, nonexclusive subtheories.
The first subtheory involves the survival or revival of the preCharter customary rule allowing forcible protection of nationals
abroad. 133 Derek Bowett argues for the survival of the customary
rule.'1
He believes that a reading of the Charter's travaux
preparatoires show that the framers intended to preserve the
"inherent" right of self-defense, with the contours acquired from
customary international law up to that point.'
More persuasively
for Bowett, state practice since the Charter was ratified has
confirmed that a significant number of states have exercised the
right to protect nationals abroad, extending the customary
international law norm into the present.36

The other version of this subtheory holds that the norm has
been revived in the modern era. Arend and Beck explain:
In their view, the UN founders mistakenly assumed that 'selfhelp' would no longer be necessary 'since an authoritative

132. Id.
133. See id. at 107.
134. See AREND &
135. See id.
136. See id.

BECK,

supra note 4, at 107.
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international organization [could now] provide the police
facilities for enforcement of international rights. [Footnote
omitted.] Unfortunately for the international system, submit
Michael Reisman, Richard Lillich, and other scholars, the UN
enforcement mechanisms have been confounded at virtually
every turn by dissension among the Security Council's
Article 2(4)'s
permanent membership. [Footnote omitted.]
prohibition on the threat or use of force, they assert, must hence
be conditioned on the United Nations' capacity to respond
effectively. When the UN fails to do so, customary law revives
and states37 may intervene to protect nationals. [Footnote
omitted.] 1

In summary, this subtheory posits that, whether it survived the
entry into force of the Charter, or was extinguished by it and later
revived by UN mal-, mis-, or nonfeasance, the customary norm
under international law permitting the use of force in the protection
of nationals abroad is alive today18
The second subtheory describes the protection of nationals
abroad as a permissible use of force below the Article 2(4)
threshold. The article itself directs: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against

137.

Id. Reisman himself continues: "A rational and contemporary inter-

pretation of the Charter must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self-help [only]
insofar as the organization can assume the role of enforcer." When the UN fails in
[Footnote omitted.] Any interits mission "self-help prerogatives revive."
pretation which fails to take this into account would merely provide "an invitation
to lawbreakers who would anticipate a paralysis in the Security Council's decision
dynamics." Id. at 107-08 (quoting Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement,
in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 850 (C. Black and R.
Falk eds., 1971)).
138. Professor McDougal summarized this position eloquently:
[T]he first important fact is that the machinery for collective police action
projected by the Charter has never been implemented. We don't have

the police forces for the United Nations, the collective machinery that
was expected to replace self-help.

In other words, there has been a

failure in certain of the major provisions for implementing the Charter.
If, in the light of this failure, we consider how we can implement the
principal purposes of minimizing coercion, of insuring that states do not
profit by coercion and violence, I submit to you that it is simply to honor
lawlessness to hold that the members of one state can, with impunity,
attack the nationals-individuals, ships, aircraft or other assets-of other

states without any fear of response.

In the absence of collective

machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would suggest that
the principle of major purpose requires an interpretation which would

honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The principle of subsequent
conduct would certainly confirm this....
Lillich, Introduction, supra note 86, at xi (quoting Myers McDougal, Authority to
Use Forceon the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 19, 28-29 (1967)).
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the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any way inconsistent with the UN's purposes."'39 Here, the key is
that Article 2(4) has two dimensions: a quantitative aspect regarding
the amount of violence or coercion, and a qualitative aspect
regarding the end to which the violence or coercion is directed. An
oversimplified reading of Article 2(4) may leave the impression of a
simple, and low, threshold, forbidding all uses or even threats of
force not flowing from self-defense or Chapter VII authorization.
The two-dimensional approach, however, keys on the language
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state .... "0 A legitimate use of force in the protection of nationals
abroad does not take or hold territory, or threaten the government
elected, or tolerated, by the people. Such a use of force is
qualitatively different, and not the type which the framers of the
Charter, with fresh memories of German and Japanese aggression,
sought to circumscribe. A brief operation which, at its conclusion,
has affected neither the territorial integrity not the political
independence of the threatening state would not appear to have
violated the qualitative prong of the Article 2(4) prohibition."'
The third subtheory is a complement of the second; it holds
that a threat to even a single national abroad is the equivalent of an
"armed attack" against the nation, allowing for a protective, and
not punitive, response proportional to the injury received or
threatened. That is, the forcible protection of nationals abroad is
permissible self-defense under Article 51.2 Since Article 51 appears not to create, but to simply recognize, "the inherent right of
self-defense," counter-restrictionists believe the Charter provides
"a local habitation and a name" for the customary right of the first
subtheory. The problem with this subtheory appears to be that, like
Article 2(4), Article 51 has both qualitative and quantitative
aspects. The former fits well with the first subtheory, in that an
"inherent" right could quite plausibly follow the contours of
customary international law. The latter, however, suggests that
there is a high threshold, "armed attack," below which the use of
force is inappropriate.
The counterargument to this last point is that it is difficult to
imagine that the framers of the Charter would create a legal noman's land, wherein a rogue state would be able to inflict violent

139.
140.
141.
142.

AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 108 (citing U.N. art. 2(4)).
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
But see RONZITrI, supra note 5, at 8-9.
See Riggs, supra note 106, at 24.
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injury, but the aggrieved state would not be able to respond in selfdefense.143

The key to reconciling

this apparent

lacuna is

proportionality: self-defense operates across the spectrum of
violence, and a small "armed attack" against a national abroad may
be met with a necessary and proportional nonpunitive response
designed to protect the victim from further harm. To the extent
that Article 51 permits reaction against less-than-overwhelming
uses of force, it demands a reciprocal limitation on the scope,
duration, and intensity of the protective response. The customary
international legal doctrines comprising the law of armed conflict-

discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and chivalry -provide
these limitations even in the absence of an absolute prohibition by
Article 51.

Finally, the fourth subtheory is grounded in a respect for
human rights. Specifically, McDougal and Reisman reject the
restrictionist premise that the UN has one overriding puirpose, the
maintenance of international peace and security. " They argue that
the UN has two such fundamental premises, each deserving equal
weight: the maintenance of international peace and security, and
4
the protection of human rights."
This view is grounded in the Preamble, Articles 1, 55, and 56,
and a large and growing corpus of human rights law.1" Under this
143. Ronzitti acknowledges the problem of assuming that an "armed attack"
can involve only aggressive international war:
[Piractice shows that, when a State intends to wrongfully use armed
coercion, it does so in one of two ways: i) by using force against the
territory of another State, or ii) by exerting armed coercion within its own
territory against foreign instrumentalities e.g. embassies) or citizens
(individuals or State organs, such as foreign representatives). Whereas in
the former case the victim may react in self-defence, in the latter this is
not possible, since it is declared that there has been no 'armed attack'.
RONZITrl, supra note 5, at 66. He continues:
[I]n recent years, particularly unpleasant episodes have repeatedly
occurred, such as the taking of hostages, and transnational terrorism.
These events are the cause of a continual state of danger. Unless the
international community acquires suitable instruments, capable of
preventing and representing [sic] such criminal events, resorting to
unilateral armed force is likely to continue to increase on the part of
those States whose nationals become the victims of terrorist attacks, in
order to fill the vacuum created by the lack of effective control
mechanisms.
Id.
144. AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 109; see also Riggs, supra note 106, at 23.
145.

See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 109.

146. See id. Arend and Beck summarize McDougal and Reisman's position:
The Preamble's "repeated emphasis upon the common interests in
human rights," argue Reisman and McDougal, "indicates that the use of
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view, human rights violations are themselves threats to
international peace and security. If the Security Council fails to act
under Chapter VII,
McDougal and Reisman argue, "the
cumulative effect of articles 1, 55, and 56 [would be] to establish the
legality of unilateral self-help."' 47
V.

Conclusion

This article defined forcible protection of nationals abroad,
reviewed commentary on the concept by publicists from the late
18th Century to the end of the pre-Charter era, and then surveyed
the major uses of force in the protection of nationals abroad during
the Charter era.
A.

Lessons of State Practice

Arend and Beck provide an outstanding structural review of
state practice in the Charter era. They examine four broad areasthe nature of intervening states, the circumstances of intervention,
the scope of intervention, and state justification for interventionand explore subcriteria within each."' From their analysis emerge
several fascinating points about how states have protected nationals
beyond their borders.
The nature of the intervening states reveals two patterns: they
have been almost exclusively Western, and there have been very
few of them. 9 Of the 16 episodes they describe, 13 involved the
use of force by just four countries: the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Belgium.15 Generally, these powers have been the only
ones in a position to effectively project military power in a troubled
region. 5

force for the urgent protection of such rights is no less authorized than
other forms of self-help." [Footnote omitted.] Under Article 1(3), they
suggest, "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights" is set out
as a fundamental purpose of the United Nations. [Footnote omitted.]
Similarly, Article 55 of the Charter points to the UN objective of
promoting "human rights" observance, while Article 56 authorizes "joint
and separate action [by Members] in cooperation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set out in Article 55." [Footnote
omitted.]
Id.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.; see also RONzIrTI, supra note 5, at 2.
See AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 103-05.
See id. at 103.
See id.
See id.
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The circumstances of the intervention have varied
considerably. The number of endangered nationals has ranged
from the thousands (in the Congo and the Dominican Republic) to
just two (in the Western Sahara). 2 The governmental situation has
also varied, from the anarchy of no government at all (Liberia, the
Dominican Republic) to a malevolent government actively
The
threatening the nationals concerned (Uganda, Iran). "3
nationality has likewise varied, from the rescue of own-country
nationals (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to the evacuation of all foreign
nationals in a troubled area (the Congo, Liberia, Grenada)."
Interestingly, almost all such operations have occurred in areas that
were, until the Charter era, under "Great Power" protection,
usually as former colonies. 5 Iran, Palestine, Egypt, Cambodia, the
Congo, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Uganda, the Western
Sahara, Grenada, Panama-all were under varying degrees of
'
This resulted in two
Great Power control under recently. 56
situations: the turbulence which often accompanies recent
independence, and a power which is both familiar with and, in a
moral sense, responsible for, the former territory.5 7
The scope of the intervention ran the gamut from brief
excursions measured in minutes (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to monthslong stays (the Dominican Republic, Egypt).'58 The longer-term
operations, however, were only initially characterized as the
protection of nationals abroad. Once that phase of the operation
had passed, new missions with new justifications took their place.
The true protective missions were extremely limited in the
territorial scope, temporal duration, and military intensity of their
effects. 9
Finally, the state justifications for the interventions varied as
well. Most states have relied on multiple rationales for their
operations, with the protection of nationals near the top of the list
in most cases."6 However, as operations lengthened or diversified,
new justifications would be advanced once the nationals sought to
be protected were secure.16
152.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 103-04.
id. at 104.
id.
id.
id. at 104.
AREND & BECK, supra note 4, at 103.
id. at 104.
id. at 105.
id.
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B. Coherent Legal Model for the Protectionof Nationals Abroad
The four subtheories advanced by the counter-restrictionist
each contain helpful elements. A model which includes the most
authoritative portions of all four would provide a 6 solid legal basis
for undertaking such operations in the Charter era. 1
The first subtheory, regarding the survival or revival of the
customary norm allowing protection of nationals, is perhaps best
understood as a synthesis of the two. To the extent that such an
understanding does not run afoul of the plain language of the
Charter, it appears that a narrowly construed form of self-defense
did survive the entry into force of the Charter, and that a long line
of customary international law informs its use today. The second
portion of this argument, however, is the more controversial. To
the extent that the United Nations did not deliver on the security it
promised in return for a limitation on the national exercise of selfdefense, that inherent right must necessarily expand to meet the
new threats. Without violating the plain meaning of the Charter,
nations should and must protect their citizens when no another
authority, national or international, is willing or able. In this sense,
this additional portion of the inherent right of self-defense has been
revived as the Unuted Nations has often proved incapable, as an
organization, of maintaining international peace and security.
The second subtheory, that such actions are below the
qualitative threshold of Article 2(4), is a close call, but, in the case
of a pure rescue operation, in accord with the facts. If no territory
is held, and if the political structure is not materially threatened, it
is difficult to argue that a rescue operation breaks the 2(4)
threshold.
The third subtheory, that such operations are lawful exercises
of the inherent right of self-defense, guaranteed by Article 51, is
perhaps the strongest argument. By allowing the threshold of an
"armed attack" to float at the level of the provocation, a
discriminate, necessary, proportionate, and chivalrous response will
guarantee compliance with international law. If a single citizen is
placed in harm's way, and only that force necessary to bring her to
safety is employed, then the protecting nation has gained no
military advantage over the threatening nation, the status quo is
maintained, and international peace and security are preserved.
Again, it is difficult to see how such an outcome violates the object
and purpose of the Charter, or the intentions of its framers.
162.

Cf. Riggs, supra note 106, at 25-33.
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Finally, the fourth subtheory argues for the equality of human
rights with international peace and security. Since the framing of
the Charter, we have learned more and more about the nature of
regimes which threaten international peace and security. None of
these governments has the requisite respect for the individual which
is the basis for civil protections against tyranny. Far from being in
tension with international peace and security, humans rights are
very much the foundation of international peace and security. A
reading of the Charter that places these two concepts in opposition
is, consciously or not, of greater service to the Benito Mussolinis of
history than the Theodore Roosevelts.

*

*

*

